This essay argues that the more the State or the political is treated as an autonomous entity, the more the specific conception of the Jews dissolves into a universalised and universalistic category. The consequence of this relationship is that any notion of Jewish specificity is undermined and is replaced instead by the language of "special pleading" or "special privileges"; that is, to quote Hal Draper, replaced by the language of "wooden sectarianism". 1 Since this relationship between the autonomy of the State and the dissolution of the Jews turns on an increasingly nihilistic attitude toward modern (political) emancipation, this essay offers not only a critical defence of such emancipation, but also of the juridical rights through which that emancipation was realised. On this point, I argue that in treating the state or the political as an autonomous entity, rights are seen as always provisional, not in the sense that they can be rescinded (history offers ample examples of such rescission), but that their application to the Jews is dependent not upon the Jews themselves (in the sense of their place and location in the world), but upon the conditional grace of others.
A current theme in critical legal and critical political literature is a renewed focus on "the political" as the foundation of the contemporary world.
2 It is for this reason that so much attention is paid to a reconsideration of the French Revolution and its aftermath. 3 In the past the emancipatory aspects of the Revolution hid the reality of terror that accompanied it, now, the inverse is the case; the rights of Man inaugurated by the Revolution are now subsumed and reduced to an aspect of the Terror. For some thinkers of this view, rights in particular and law in general are nothing other than violence and, as such, are not so much part of the answer as part of the problem.
This essay argues that this concentration on the political and its relation to terror reproduces in critical theory the very error that produced in the terror in the first place.
Then as now, the error was to believe that in the separation of state from society, the former was not only autonomous of the latter, but was also the moulder of the latter. To put the matter in the language of Hegel and Marx, the universality of the State sought to impose itself on the particularism of civil society. 4 Speaking with special reference to the question of religion, Marx notes the following, Of course, in periods when the political state as such is born violently out of civil society, when political liberation is the form in which men strive to achieve their liberation, the state can and must go as far as the abolition of religion, the destruction of religion. But it can do so only in the same way that it proceeds to the abolition of private property, to the maximum, to confiscation, to progressive taxation, just as it goes as far as the abolition of life, the guillotine. At times of special self-confidence, political life seeks to suppress its prerequisite, civil society and the elements composing this society, and to constitute itself as the real species-life of man, devoid of contradictions. But it can achieve this only by coming into violent contradiction with its own conditions of life, only by declaring the revolution to be permanent, and, therefore, the political drama necessarily ends with the re-establishment of religion, private property, and all elements of civil society, just as war ends with peace. [Marx, OJQ] .
As with the rule of the political itself, the theoretical suppression of the social exercises a terror in its own theoretical way. It excludes and denies the social development and social presence of the diverse "particularities" (including, of course, the Jews) threatened by the dominance and autonomy of the universal of the political.
Nowhere are these points more in evidence than in the question of Jewish emancipation and the rights through which it is expressed. In the two accounts discussed here -Bruno
Bauer's and Giorgio Agamben's -the entire "Jewish Question" is presented through the prism of the autonomy of the political. In each, the rights of emancipation are presented as dependent or conditional upon a political decision. The decision becomes, in other words, the jurisdiction of the sovereign rather than the outcome of historically specific social developments.
Since this political sovereign acts, and can only act, in the name of the universal, the condition of emancipation becomes infused with a dependence on the criterion of universality. but to keep them in the most humiliating and servile unemancipated conditions. Adding insult to injury, Bauer argued that since all forms of religion are the signature of unfreedom. In a Christian state, no-one is "truly free", not even those who benefit from the correspondence between their own and the state religion. The demand of the Jews for their emancipation, is, in effect, a demand for special consideration.
Everybody is unfree in an absolute monarchy. The Jew is only unfree in a particular manner. The hope and wish of the Jew should not be for the removal of his special misery but for the downfall of a principle. [quoted in Draper; p113] In the face of this universal oppression, therefore, all gradation of oppression, indeed, of the division of the oppressed into a sub-category of oppressor and oppressed is ignored.
Where Bauer broke new ground, however, was in his argument against the Jews' emancipation as Jews into the modern, politically emancipated, secular state. To be permitted to enter this state, Bauer avers, entails that the Jews emancipate themselves from Judaism.
To justify this aspect of his counter-emancipationist thesis, Bauer argues that the mark of the modern emancipated state is its emancipation from religion. As a consequence of this religious emancipation only those individuals who have shed the shackles of religion can be permitted into its secularly-hallowed halls. On this count, again, the Jews as Jews are barred. Moreover, the secular state emerged out of the skin of the Christian state, it is not enough anymore for the Jews to become Christian, but, rather, they must adopt the "later"
stage of "Christianity in dissolution". In overcoming Judaism, Christianity exhibits a self-consciousness of "man's universal essence" in a way unknown to Judaism. Christianity's universality arises, according to Bauer, by absorbing into itself the entirety of humanity's awareness of itself as the power of creation. Christianity embodies the awareness of humanity's separation from nature (as well as its power over it 11 ), but does so in a distorted or inverse manner. At this stage in the story, self-consciousness lacks the strength and will to comprehend fully the consequences of this awareness. Instead, it makes its appearance through the theology of Christianity in which all humanity's creative energies are placed and through which real men and women are correspondingly devalued. As such "empty" beings, humanity cannot but see themselves as the playthings of an external, eternal and omnipotent God.
The political corollary of this awareness is the destruction of the Christian state and the establishment of the religiously emancipated political state.
As its terminology implies, the Christian state mirrors the relationship of God to humanity in its theological appearance. The state appears to be everything and its subjects nothing,
The Christian state is guided by the dictates of religion, it suppresses all manifestations of free and autonomous thoughts, leads to the banishing of the spirit, lulls all the predilections and aspirations of mankind, is guilty of causing crime, etc.. [Rosen; p.116] It is only when "the people" are brought to the truth of their situation that they can inaugurate the era of "true freedom" through which self-consciousness becomes aware of itself as the driving spirit of world history.
It follows, therefore, that for Bauer, the destruction of religion and the destruction of the Christian state are one and the same thing. It is as a consequence of this set of beliefs that
Bauer believes that the emancipated states in which religion is no longer either a bar or entry into the state, is identical with humanity's emancipation from religion per se. Those people who are still persuaded by the shackles of religion need not apply for entry.
It is within this theoretical context that Bauer locates the "origins" of rights and, in so doing, denies their applicability to Jews. Since "the universal rights of man" are the expression of the developed self-consciousness and since the Jews have remained outside that development, they cannot expect to share in its fruits. Indeed, as long as they remain Jews, they remain outside the realm of "the universal". Marx quotes Bauer at length on
The question is whether the Jew as such, that is, the Jew who himself admits that he is compelled by his true nature to live permanently in separation from other men, is capable of receiving the universal rights of man and of conceding them to others.
For the Christian world, the idea of the rights of man was only discovered in the last century. It is not innate in man; on the contrary, it is gained only in a struggle against the historical traditions in which hitherto man was brought up. Thus, the rights of man are not the gift of nature, nor a legacy of past history, but the reward of the struggle against the accident of birth and against the privileges which up to now have been handed down by history from generation to generation. These rights are the result of culture, and only one who has, and only one who has earned and deserved them can possess them.
Can the Jew really take possession of them? As long as he is a Jew, the restricted nature which makes him a Jew is bound to triumph over the human nature which should link him as a man with other men, and will separate him from non-Jews.
He declares by this separation that the particular nature which makes him a Jew is his true highest nature, before which human nature has to give way.
Not only are Jews barred from "the universal rights of man" because of their restricted nature brought about by their exclusion from the history of self-consciousness, but to argue for rights and emancipation as Jews would again be to claim "priority treatment".
If humanity's emancipation from religion is synonymous with the state's emancipation from religion, why should the Jews be made an exception? From Bauer's point of view, the very fact that the Jews are seeking emancipation as Jews can be read as a reflection of their innate particularist and narrow "nature", one that is divorced from "Universal Humanity". To be granted (and to grant) emancipation, therefore, the Jews have no option but to dissolve themselves into that general universality; to become "human" at the expense of being Jewish.
Leaving aside Bauer's personal anti-Jewish animosity, 12 the question remains as to why he got it so wrong? The answer to this question, I believe, is a consequence of his overarching theoretical thinking and the application of that thought to the question of political emancipation. In short, it exhibits a correlation between the autonomy of the theorist and the autonomy of the state or "political".
At the core of this problem is Bauer's notion of "criticism" or "pure criticism". As Rosen makes clear, Bauer's criticism is "absolute". It is absolute in the sense that it posits "spirit" (of which self-consciousness is the specific expression) against reality, i. 13 Draper, opp cit p.226
Amongst the more specific criticisms Marx 14 made of Bauer's "absolutist" standpoint two, when taken together, are of special significance in the present context. These criticisms are, first, the fact that the present is seen as the product of a past battle of ideas "devoid from any material basis" [Rosen, p.236] . In this exclusion from the "arena of real events", and this is the second point, the realm of ideas triumphs over the realm of interests.
It is not the case that Bauer believes merely in the primacy and perspective of ideas over materiality as the basis for "criticism", but he also believes that the purer the separation, the purer and more valid the criticism. It is because "[t]he Critical Truth "addresses itself not to the empirical man but to the "innermost depths of the soul"" that social interests will have an negative impact on the purity of ideas. Bauer makes this point clear in his discussion of the shortcomings of the French Revolution, "All great actions of previous history…….were failures from the start and had no marked success because the mass became interested in and enthusiastic over them; in other words, they were bound to come to a pitiful end because the idea involved in them such that it had to be satisfied with a superficial conception and, therefore, had to rely upon the approval of the mass" -quoted Draper; p.223]
It is in his earlier response to Bauer's anti-emancipationist argument that Marx presents the matter not only from the side of interest, but also from its inclusion in the side of idea.
14 See Rosen opp cit
This alternative approach to the Jewish question is apparent immediately in Marx's rejection of the concept of the "Sabbath Jew" for that of the "Everyday Jew".
Let us consider the actual, worldly Jew -not the Sabbath Jew as Bauer does, but the everyday Jew.
Let us not look for the secret of the Jew in his religion, but let us look for the secret of his religion in the real Jew.
What is the secular basis of Judaism? Practical need, self-interest. What is the worldly religion of the Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly God? Money.
Very well, then! Emancipation from huckstering and money, consequently, from practical, real Judaism, would be the self-emancipation of our time.
What is of note here is not only Marx's recognition of the social interest of the Jews, but also its placement in a material historical development.
It is because of Marx's insistence on the Jews' material rather than idealist existence that he can dispense with the teleological "overcoming" of "the Jew" that Bauer sees in the unfolding of "self-consciousness". By recognising their social existence that Marx rests his analysis of rights and, ultimately, Jewish emancipation. Marx makes these points overt, "Judaism continues to exist not in spite of history, but owing to history."
Judaism has held its own alongside Christianity, not only as religious criticism of Christianity, not only as the embodiment of doubt in the religious derivation of Christianity, but equally, because the practical Jewish spirit, Judaism, has maintained itself and even attained its highest development in Christian society.
In speaking of "the practical Jewish spirit", Marx is pointing to Judaism's historical role in satisfying the needs and wants of earthly, as opposed to spiritual "man". Or, in Bauer's terms, remaining close to the nature disavowed and degraded by Christianity, The Jews, in other words, have not only always been part of history, they had an important role to play in the development of the modern world. It was a role that in serving their own, particular, i.e. self-interest, has served the universal interest.
Turning to the question of "universal rights", the so-called "rights of Like the Jews, or, rather, the "everyday Jews", so rights are the product of material, historically developed interests, in this instance, the interests of private property. They are nothing other than expressions of the nature and content of civil society. Far from the external connection between rights and spirit made by Bauer, and through which it is left to Bauer as the omnipotent sovereign and legislator of "self-consciousness" to decide to include or exclude, Marx highlights its internal connections. In doing so, he has shown that far from history and interests being grounds for refusal they are, in fact, the very basis and justification of inclusion.
What the review of this debate has shown is the connection between the position of the critic and the position of the state and the relationship of each -or seeming lack of relationship -to the body politic within which is embedded; the more autonomous the critic and the more autonomous the state, the more provisional the rights and inclusion of the Jews. The more, theoretically and practically, the Jews become dependent on power, the more insecure they are and vulnerable to the whim of the theorist and the state. It is to a more recent account of Jewish emancipation, that we will now turn.
II
If Bauer's account of emancipation emphasised "spirit" over materiality, Giorgio
Agamben's work emphasises materiality over spirit; or, rather, "humanness" over spirit.
What is interesting is that whichever side of the duality, humanity/spirit, is emphasised the result is the same -the dissolution of the Jews and the "Jewish Question" into a generalised and universalised stream of history. As will also become apparent, the cause of this replication again is the refusal to acknowledge, or, rather, the suppression of the middle term between humanity and spirit -the social.
Unlike Bauer's acceptance of the French Revolution (at least initially) Giorgio
Agamben's work can be situated within the broad church of the critical counterRevolutionary tradition, stretching as far back as the enigmatic discourses of Joseph deMaistre. 15 As Zizek notes in his introduction to the speeches of Robespierre,
The identifying mark of all kinds of conservatives is its flat rejection: the French Revolution was a catastrophe from its very beginning, the product of the godless modern mind; it is to be interpreted as God's punishment for humanity's wicked ways, so its traces should be done as thoroughly as possible. [p.vii].
Agamben's thought combines two of the most important elements of this tradition. The first is a complete rejection of the French Revolution through the idea that emancipation is nothing but domination through the universalisation of terror. The second is inherent within the first. It is the idea that it was these events that banished God and spirit from the profane world leaving humanity to the arbitrary vagaries of man's unfettered hubristic powers 16 . These two elements are combined and given effect that in Agamben's conception of "the political" in general and his account of nazism in particular.
One of the key aspects of the tradition in which Agamben works is the presentation of the Revolution solely in terms of abject terror and violence. If for deMaistre, this presentation meant universalising and reifying the "moment" of the "Reign of Terror", 17 for Agamben, it is the universalising and reifying of the "moment" of the State of Siege The only difference, therefore, between modern and classical thought is the inclusion of the oikos, of natality, within the confines of the political, of the state, It is in this context of an apparent "radical transformation" that the concept of "biopolitics" is so apposite to describe the fusion of polis and oikos. In the discussion of biopolitics that follows, it is important to keep in mind its seemingly creative and, at the same time, judgemental powers. 22 Marx has argued that part of the reason for the Jacobin terror was their confusion between the contemporaneous situation, and that of the classical world Of vital importance for Agamben, is that the key elements of this fusion of the political and the natural (as expressed in the discourses of natural science) when taken together, constitute biopolitics' ontological status. Biopolitics, Agamben emphasises, is not the application of prior knowledge onto a pre-existing set of data, i.e. bare [natural] life, but is rather a power that creates, judges and executes at one and the same time 23 The link between politics and life…….is not (as it is maintained by a common and completely inadequate interpretation of racism) merely an instrumental relationship, as if race were a simple natural given that had merely to be safeguarded. The novelty of modern biopolitics lies in the fact that the biologically given is as such immediately political, and the political is as such immediately the biologically given. [pp147-148; emphasis added]
Rather than confronting an external, "objective" world, biopolitics believes itself capable of creating a world in its own (humanist, scientific) image. Indeed, as just noted, the moment of creation and the moment of evaluation is a decision not so much located in the realm of the political, but is its very definition. What is so important for Agamben, is not so much the seemingly normalcy and precedents 24 that attach to the Third Reich (indeed, in more than one place, a paragraph that begins with a discussion of the French Revolution is intertwined with facets of the "Nazi State" 25 ), but that it is with nazism that the exception becomes the rule
It is through this prism of biopolitics that
The state of exception thus ceases to be referred to as an external and provisional state of factual danger and comes to be confused with juridical rule itself. The camp is the space that is opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule. In the camp, the state of exception, which was essentially a temporary suspension of the rule of law on the basis of a factual state of danger, is now given a permanent spatial arrangement, which as such remains outside the normal order.
[p.169]
It is within this post-Revolutionary generality that Agamben locates the specificity of the nazi camps, all mediations are cancelled and where state of exception and biopolitics, law and power, fact and application, exception and norm, inclusion and exclusion, Jew and aryan fuse into an equally interstitial moment that is autonomous of even the Kantian notions of space and time. Although Agamben does not phrase it in this way, it is the threshold also of the profane and the divine.
The camp is the space of this absolute impossibility of deciding between fact and law, rule and application, exception and rule, which nevertheless incessantly decides between them. What confronts the guard or the camp official is not an extrajuridical fact (an individual belonging to the Jewish race) to which he must apply the discrimination of the National Socialist rule. On the contrary, every gesture, every event in the camp, from the most ordinary to the most exceptional, enacts the decision on bare life by which the German biopolitical body is made actual. The separation of the Jewish body, just as its production is the application of the rule. [pp.173-174] What is interesting about Agamben's account of the camp is the emphasis he places not so much of the power of destruction, but on the power of creation. (Indeed, this is Agamben's uniquely novel contribution to the history of "the camp"). From the above quote, it is not solely the case that the nazis murders the Jews, but that, at one and the same time, they created the aryan. It is at this point that Agamben takes the argument a step further. It is also here that any specifically Jewish aspect of the holocaust is dissolved into an overtly universalist stream of history. It is in the creation of the Musselman that is deemed the "decisive function" of the camps, of nazism and of the state of exception. The genocide of the Jews is but a means to an end, and, no longer an end in itself. The murder of Jews loses its specific meaning and is, instead, dissolved into something even more "significant" and universal. That significance is the birth of an entirely new form of life; homo sacer or the Musselman.
It is in the camps, in the furnace of unlimited and autonomous power that "Man" has found the power to finally usurp God and to create life. However, Agamben believes that it is a life that is devoid of the divine spark and, instead, bears the mark of its bio-political
Creator. This new life, homo sacer, exists, like the state of exception, like the camp, at the threshold of the divine and the profane, between heaven and earth, between life and death -the one who can be killed and not sacrificed. Homo sacer is the new universal citizen, the immediate product of the post-Revolutionary political Republic -an "absolute biological substance".
What is so troubling about Agamben's account of antisemitism is the way in which it replicates Marx's comments about Jacobin terror and the manner in which the narrowness of political terror attempts to suppress the social along with its competing interests. And, as Marx's critique of Bauer has shown, it is in the realm of the social not only that "real flesh and blood Jews" exist, but where their interests come into conflicts with the interests of other social parties which, in turn, gives rise to an anti-Jewish praxis. It is from this perspective that Arendt offers a critique of modern emancipation, rights and antisemitism that is the outcome of a social and political presence, rather than the arbitrary consequence of autonomous power.
Contrast this view with
In accounting for modern antisemitism, Arendt looks most closely at the mechanisms of emancipation and the nature of the rights through which it was expressed. Put briefly, her argument is that antisemitism was the product of a conflict between Jews and Gentiles brought about by the split between civil society and the state that she sees as characterising the modern body politic. For Arendt, the "autonomy" or separation of the state from civil society that followed the Revolutions of the later 18 th century was almost stillborn. Chief amongst these problems was a lack of those willing to finance the State institutions. Whereas the ancien regime, relied on the nobility for its financial support, the emerging bourgeoisie was far too concerned with its own interests even to contemplate funding the new State. 27 It is at this point that the Jews presented themselves as a possible way to avoid collapse. Key to this strategy, however, was to ensure that the Jews remained outside the body politic, or, rather, outside the class structure of civil society. And, at this point, the needs and interests of the State coincided with the needs and interests of a Jewish desire to ensure "self-preservation and group survival".
Paradoxically, this coincidence of aims became the ground for the granting of rights, a grant that, as Marx also saw, was dependent upon Jewish presence and activity.
As Arendt makes clear, it was this equivocality of modern Jewish existence that lay entwined within the core of emancipation from the beginning, Arendt notes that the consequence of this specific relationship between State and the Jews, and which, was an "open secret" to all concerned, was that each class that entered into conflict with the State also entered into a conflict with the Jews. It was as a consequence of these clashes that when the nation-state evaporated a century and a half later the totalitarianism that replaced it structured itself around the specificity of the Jews and antisemitism,
[T]he Jewish question and antisemitism, relatively unimportant phenomena in terms of world politics, became the catalytic agent first for the rise of the Nazi movement and the establishment of the organizational structure of the Third Reich, in which every citizen had to prove he was not a Jew, then for a world war of unprecedented ferocity, and finally for the emergence of the unprecedented crime of genocide in the midst of Occidental civilization. [p.x] It was, partly as a result of these conflicts that with the decline of the nation-state some hundred years or so later and its substitution with totalitarianism and the mass in place of state and civil society, the Jews were thrown into the storm centre of events.
As this last point makes clear, Arendt draws a strong distinction between the nation-state and totalitarianism (i.e. nazism). It is important to note, however, that even though she argues that antisemitism only came to maturity as an ideology or "key to history" after the reality of Jewish-Gentile conflicts of interests, 28 she still offers an account of nazism that draws on its external preconditions. That precondition is what she terms "superfluousness". Superfluousness points to the idea that totalitarianism can only arise at a point in time when the majority of the nation-state's population is deemed to be "superfluousness" in the sense of unnecessary for rational economic, social and political purposes. Indeed, it is the desire to make lives meaningful that Arendt sees as the attraction and necessity of totalitarianism. The point is, however, that for Arendt, in contradiction to Agamben, antisemitism, is the outcome not of autonomous and automatic practices, but of very real conflicts of interest brought about by very real socially-situated groups of individuals, including those of an active Jewish history.
Arendt is this able to hold on to both the universal significance of totalitarianism, its camps and its murders, whilst, at the same time, acknowledging to specific nature of nazism's obsession with the Jews.
Conclusion
28 Arendt notes that assimilation was almost complete following the loss of the Jews' financing of the State.
By focussing their attention on the alleged autonomy of the state, both Bauer and Agamben reproduce the very terror at the theoretical level that is implied in Bauer's antiemancipationist approach and is the object of critique in Agamben's work. At both the normative and descriptive levels, the universalism of the political is treated as if its dominance over and separation from the social is an accomplished fact. The terror Marx recognised as necessary in such domination -the suppression of particularities -is repeated. This replication, the entire presence and history of emancipated Jewry, that is, their modern social existence which includes their specific interests as well as their conflict of interests with other groups is denied and erased from the record. The specificity of antisemitism and the holocaust are dissolved into a universalist domination through which mass murder becomes the responsibility of no-one and the fate of all without distinction. Not only, therefore, are we left with a genocide without perpetrators, 30 but also, a holocaust without Jews. And, as Hannah Arendt notes,
In this inherent negation of the significance of human behaviour, they bear a terrible resemblance to those modern practices and forms of government which, by means of arbitrary terror, liquidate the very possibility of human activity.
Somehow in the extermination camps Jews were murdered as if in accordance with the explanation these doctrines had given of why they were hated: regardless of what they had done or omitted to do, regardless of vice or virtue. Moreover, the murderers themselves, only obeying orders and proud of their passionless efficiency, uncannily resembled the "innocent" instruments of an inhuman
